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Investing Social Security
Trust funds in the stock
market
By 2022, Social Security outlays will
begin to outstrip its revenues. Because
of these deficits, the Social Security
Trust is expected to run out of cash
in 2034 (see figure 1).1 The source of
this problem is Social Security’s Pay-
As-You-Go structure, whereby benefi-
ciaries are paid, not from their own
accumulated deposits, but from the
contributions of workers who are cur-
rently depositing money into the sys-
tem. As large numbers of the baby-
boom generation retire, a small num-
ber of post-baby-boom workers will
be supporting the pensions of this
large population.
To avert the predicted bankruptcy,
there are three options: 1) increase
revenues by increasing the payroll tax
and the earnings cap, 2) reduce ben-
efits, and/or 3) increase the rate of
return on funds in the Social Security
Trust. In this Chicago Fed Letter, we
take a closer look at the third option,
increasing the rate of return on Social
Security funds.
Under current law, the funds that re-
main after benefits have been distrib-
uted are stored in the form of risk-free
Treasury securities. In recent history,
however, equity investments have sig-
nificantly outperformed Treasury
securities. For example, the after-
inflation annual return on Standard
& Poor’s 500 stocks for the 1947–96
period was 9.5%, while that of long-
term Treasury bonds was only 1.8%.2
This difference in returns between
stocks and Treasury bonds is known
as the equity premium. Capitalizing on
the equity premium by investing in
stocks has been proposed as a painless
way to prolong the viability of Social
Security and is the impetus behind
many reform packages. Currently,
there are three House bills and two
Senate bills of this type pending in
the 106th Congress. The White House
has also informally presented its own
reform plan incorporating equities.
The reform plans fall into four cate-
gories. The first category comprises
plans that dismantle the current Social
Security system and replace it with
personal retirement accounts.3 With
these plans, workers are allocated in-
dividual retirement
accounts in which to
deposit a percentage
of their earnings. They
can invest these funds
in a selection of preap-










allows for a small part
of workers’ earnings to
be deposited into individual accounts.4
These proposals are modeled after
the Federal Retirement Thrift plan
available to federal employees. Funds
in individual accounts can be invested
in preapproved mutual funds, and in-
dividual Social Security benefits are
reduced by the amount diverted to
the personal accounts.
The third class of proposals does not
allow for individual accounts but per-
mits the Social Security Trust fund
to invest in stocks. An independent
board would be established to over-
see investments.5
Finally, there is a hybrid type of plan
that allows for both individual accounts
and a limited amount of investment of
the Trust in the stock market.6 As with
the first two types of plans, individuals
can invest money in their individual ac-
counts in preapproved funds, and their
Social Security benefits are reduced
accordingly. In addition, a prelegislated
percentage of the Trust fund would be
invested in stocks.
The issue of stock market risk
The above review of the proposals
shows that the reformers advocate two
ways of increasing returns of Social
Security deposits—allowing individuals
to use their deposits to invest in the
market and permitting the Trust fund
to invest directly. Both of these types
of proposals make two important as-
sumptions that should be examined
more closely.
The first assumption is that investment
in equities will generate higher returns
than investment in government bonds.
While it is true that, historically, the
average equity premium has been
quite large, these high equity returns
do not come without cost. Stocks are
riskier than government securities.
The equity premium is properly
trillions of current dollars
Source: Social Security Administration, 1999, OASDI Trustees Report.










52.  Social Security simulation results
Probability Median
of bankruptcy year of
Investment options before 2034 bankruptcy
(percent)
Current system
No investment in equities – 2034
Assuming historical mean
and variance of equity return
Low equities (10%) 0.02 2038
Moderate equities (21%) 0.06 2045
High equities (50%) 0.11 2053
Dynamic model with
bootstrapping
Low equities (10%) 0.13 2035
Moderate equities (21%) 0.53 2038
High equities (50%) 1.01 2046
Source: Authors’ calculations.
regarded as compensation for the
additional risk borne by stocks. Thus,
investing in equities would introduce
additional risk into the Social Security
system. Policymakers need to assess
how much additional risk is involved,
who will bear this risk, and whether
the potential benefits of these pro-
posals outweigh the additional risk.
The second assumption underlying
these proposals is that the average
historical rates of return to equities
will continue into the future. This
assumption is potentially dangerous.
As Cochrane (1997) and Marshall
and Duffy (1998) point out, periods
during which equity prices are high7
tend to be followed by periods of un-
usually low stock returns.8 Stock mar-
ket prices are currently extremely high
by any measure. Thus, we would ex-
pect several years of lower-than-average
returns to equity investors. For exam-
ple, Welch (1998) reports that, among
financial economists, consensus fore-
casts of the future equity premium
range from 3% to 6%, lower than
the postwar mean equity premium
of nearly 8%.9
Because of the additional risk and
the possibility of lower than average
equity returns, the potential benefits
of investing Social Security monies
in the stock market are somewhat
ambiguous.
Assessing the risk of equity investment
for the Social Security Trust
We quantify one element of the risk
added to the Social Security system
when a portion of the Trust is invested
in equities. Our measure of risk is the
probability that the Social Security
Trust will run out of funds prior to
2034, the date projected for Social
Security bankruptcy under the Social
Security Administration’s (SSA) inter-
mediate scenario.
We consider three alternative scenarios
that represent the range of proposals.
The low investment scenario invests
10% of annual Trust fund balances
in equities. This scenario is represen-
tative of the Feldstein proposal.10
The second scenario is the moderate
scenario with 21% of the Trust fund
money being directed to equities,
consistent with the White House
proposal of Social Security reform.11
Finally, the high investment scenario
envisions 50% of Social Security de-
posits invested in equities, consistent
with House plan HR874.12
We model the risk of equities in two
different ways. Our first approach
ignores the current high valuation
of the stock market. Specifically, we
assume that future returns follow a
normal (bell-shaped) distribution
with the mean and variance equal to
1941–98 historical estimates.
Our second approach uses a dynamic
model of returns.13 With this model,
the future distribution of returns is
predicted by the current state of the
market. In particular, we follow Fama
and French (1989)14 in using the
dividend yield, the default premium,
and the term premium to predict
equity returns.15
We estimate the dynamic model using
data from 1941 to 1998 and then use
the estimated model to simulate fu-
ture returns. The simulations use a
“bootstrapping” methodology to ac-
count for the fact that the distribution
of historical returns is not normal, but
fat-tailed. With the fat-tailed distribu-
tion, there is greater likelihood that
extreme events—for example, very




ing effect of current
high price–dividend
ratios on future expect-
ed returns, this method
represents a more con-
servative assumption
about the distribution
of future returns than
our first approach.
Using the distribution
of returns implied by
each approach, we sim-
ulate the evolution of
the Social Security Trust
fund and obtain the
date of bankruptcy of
the fund. We do these
simulations 50,000 times
to obtain a distribution
of bankruptcy dates. We then com-
pare this distribution of predicted
end dates to the SSA’s projected
2034 bankruptcy date.
Our results are quite striking. If one
assumes that future equity returns will
have the same mean and variance as
in the past, then investing Social Secu-
rity Trust funds in the stock market
is an unqualified boon. As figure 2
shows, the probability that equity risk
causes the Trust to go bankrupt be-
fore its current projected bankruptcy
date (2034) is less than 0.2% for all
three scenarios. When 21% of the
Trust is invested in stocks (a level
roughly corresponding to the White
House proposal), the median date of
bankruptcy rises to 2045, a full 11
years later than the current projected
bankruptcy date.
Under the second, more conservative
approach, however, the potential
benefits of equity investment are con-
siderably lower: with 21% of the Trust
invested in stocks, the median bank-
ruptcy date of the Trust is 2038—only
a four-year reprieve over the SSA’s
projected bankruptcy date. In addi-
tion, the risk of early bankruptcy
(before 2034) is somewhat higher.
Still, these probabilities are quite
small—mostly less than 1%—suggest-
ing that investing Trust funds in stocks
would pose little additional bankruptcy
risk to the Social Security system.Some additional issues
In reality, these proposals are more
complex than our simulations. One
of the complications not addressed in
the simulations is that many proposals
include a minimum annuity that en-
sures that, even if individuals invest
badly, they will receive some minimum
Social Security benefit. Thus, individ-
uals’ losses are limited, but any gains
are theirs to keep. Since they are in-
sured against losses, individuals have
an incentive to put their money in
riskier investments. This would increase
the probability of substantial losses for
the system as a whole (but not for the
individual), so the strain on Social
Security would be even greater than
the simulations indicate.
Who would ultimately bear the risk
if there were a sustained drop in the
stock market? Currently, the individ-
ual investor bears the downside risk
with IRA and 401K plans, while pri-
vate corporations bear the risk with
corporate pension plans. If Social
Security were to invest funds directly
in equity markets or if Social Security
were converted to a system of individ-
ual accounts with guaranteed mini-
mum benefits, the taxpayers would
bear the downside risk.
If there were no guaranteed benefits,
individuals would bear the risk, but
this scenario hardly seems consistent
with the stated purpose of Social Se-
curity to provide a safety net. Further-
more, if many workers were affected
by a sustained adverse event in the
stock market, the government might
be pressured to provide funds to bail
out these unlucky individuals. In that
event, taxpayers would bear the ulti-
mate risk.
We conclude from this analysis that
allowing equity investment of Social
Security Trust funds would introduce
a relatively small amount of addition-
al risk into the Social Security system.
The resulting benefits, however, would
also be modest. Equity investment
does not represent a painless way to
“save” Social Security. The actuarial
imbalances implied by Social Securi-
ty’s current economic and demo-
graphic assumptions may ultimately
require politically painful tradeoffs.
—David Marshall
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Light truck production decreased from 7.6 million units in August to 6.9 mil-
lion units in September and car production remained constant at 5.7 million
units for both August and September. The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufacturing
Index (CFMMI) fell 0.8% from August to September. The revised data show
the index rose 0.6% in August. The national Industrial Production Index for
manufacturing (IP) decreased 0.2% in September.
The Midwest purchasing managers’ composite index (a weighted average of
the Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee surveys) for production increased to
60.4% in October from 57.5% in September. The purchasing manager’s indexes
increased for all three surveys for the second consecutive month. The national
purchasing managers’ survey for production decreased from 61.7% in Sep-
tember to 58.3% in October.
Sources: The Chicago Fed Midwest Manufactur-
ing Index (CFMMI) is a composite index of 16
industries, based on monthly hours worked and
kilowatt hours. IP represents the Federal Reserve
Board’s Industrial Production Index for the U.S.
manufacturing sector. Autos and light trucks are
measured in annualized units, using seasonal ad-
justments developed by the Board. The purchas-
ing managers’ survey data for the Midwest are
weighted averages of the seasonally adjusted pro-
duction components from the Chicago, Detroit,
and Milwaukee Purchasing Managers’ Association
surveys, with assistance from Kingsbury Interna-
tional, LTD., Comerica, and the University of
Wisconsin–Milwaukee.
Motor vehicle production (millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Purchasing managers’ surveys:
net % reporting production growth
Oct. Month  ago Year ago
MW 60.4 57.5 57.5
U.S. 58.3 61.7 52.6
Motor vehicle production
(millions, seasonally adj. annual rate)
Sep. Month  ago Year ago
Cars 5.7 5.7 6.5





Sep. Month  ago Year ago
CFMMI 131.7 132.7 127.5
IP 139.5 139.8 135.2





Tracking Midwest manufacturing activity